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31.  Introduction1
At the time of writing there were widespread concerns about the health of the U.S. economy.
There is conclusive evidence that the pace of growth has slowed, which has prompted the
Federal Reserve to cut interest rates on two occasions (a total of 100 basis points thus far).  As
usual, when faced with this kind of turning point, analysts and policy makers alike wonder
whether the United States will achieve a “soft landing” or whether the downturn is more serious
and protracted—in the worst scenario, the new weakness could signal the end of the new
economy.  Furthermore, recent inflation surprises have not been encouraging, as higher-than-
expected inflation numbers may curtail the Federal Reserve’s desire and ability to act
countercyclically.
In this paper, we do not attempt to provide any insights into what lies ahead for the U.S.
economy.  Our focus is on gaining a better understanding of how the U.S. business cycle, its
associated monetary policy cycle, and their interaction affect developing countries.  The question
of North-South linkages is hardly a new one; the role of trade and primary commodity markets in
linking developed and developing countries has a long history (see, for instance, Prebisch, 1950
and Singer, 1950).  The links between debtor and creditor nations are also not new (see Diaz-
Alejandro, 1984, Dornbusch, 1985, and Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart, 1993).  Indeed, what is
“new” is that some links that had been thought to be extinct have revived in recent years while
some “old” links have weakened.   As Bordo and Eichengreen (1998) observe, the decade of the
1990s shares some of the features of an earlier age of globalization and high capital mobility
prior to World War I; namely, portfolio capital flows to emerging markets have re-emerged as an
important link between northern lenders and southern borrowers.  This revival is particularly
pronounced in the larger Latin American countries.  Some of the traditional links, however, may
have weakened, as many countries in Asia and Latin America have successfully diversified their
exports away from primary commodities.  Hence, terms-of-trade shocks may (in some cases)
play a smaller role today than in the past.  Both of these observations would suggest that, in
general, trade/commodity price links may have weakened while financial links may have become
stronger.  However, one must be cautious in interpretation owing to the large variation across
countries in the degree of trade and capital market integration.  While the share of primary
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4commodities in Mexico’s exports has declined dramatically in the past 30 years, the importance
of U.S. markets, owing to NAFTA, has soared, which suggests that the trade channel is
quantitatively important in the Mexican case.2  These are the questions we analyze.  Our focus is
on how developments in the United States affect capital flows and growth in emerging market
countries across various regions and country groups.
In the next section, we review the transmission mechanisms whereby shocks in the North
are propagated to the South.  In Section 3, we present the stylized evidence on how capital flows
and growth in developing countries vary with the business and monetary policy cycle in the
United States, while in Section 4 we present some basic tests that take a first cut at the data.  The
final section summarizes our main findings.
2. North-South Links
In this section, we discuss various channels through which economic developments in developed
countries, particularly the United States, can potentially affect developing economies.3  On the
emerging markets side, our focus is on capital flows—their level and composition—and on
economic performance, as measured by GDP growth. One strand of our analysis focuses on the
role of the economic cycle in the United States, while the other focuses on the interest rate cycle.
The Channels of Transmission
Simple trade models suggest that a slowdown in a large developed economy will have adverse
consequences on its trading partners, to the extent that the demand for imports in the decelerating
economy has a positive income elasticity.  The higher the share of exports of the country that are
funneled to the country experiencing the economic downturn, the more negative the
consequences.  On the basis of this channel, for example, Mexico would be far more affected by
an economic downturn in the United States than Argentina, since as of 1999 about 88 percent of
all Mexican exports were directed toward the U.S. market, while only about 11 percent of
Argentina’s exports were destined for the United States.4  Furthermore, the degree of openness
(say, as measured by exports to GDP) reinforces the contrast between Argentina and Mexico,
with the former being a much more closed economy. Other things being equal, the higher the
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5income elasticity of imports in the developed country, the more pronounced the contraction in
the developing country’s exports will be.  In this regard, developing countries that export
predominantly manufactured goods (which typically are more sensitive to income) may fare
worse than their counterparts exporting primary commodities, which tend to be relatively
income-inelastic.5  The differences in export structure across developing countries are, indeed,
significant.  For instance, the contrast between the export structure of East Asian countries
(heavily weighted to manufactures) and that of most African countries (predominantly skewed to
primary commodities) is particularly striking.6
The preceding discussion, however, ignores the fact that the business cycle in the world’s
largest economies may itself exert a significant influence on the terms of trade of their smaller
trading partners, the developing countries, as argued in Dornbusch (1985).  Perhaps the clearest
example of this comes from international commodity markets.  The literature on commodity
price determination has consistently accorded a significant role to the growth performance of the
major industrial countries.7  Recessions in industrial economies, particularly the United States,
have historically been associated with weakness in real commodity prices.  The implication is
that, other things being equal, commodity exporters, who are also hit with an adverse terms-of-
trade shock, will suffer more. Finally, a change in real exchange rates among G-3 countries will
also have an impact. For example, a depreciation of the U.S. dollar versus the Euro would most
benefit countries whose currencies are tied to the U.S. dollar but tend to export to Europe (i.e.,
Argentina).
Yet, the impact of fluctuations in the business cycle on developing economies is not
limited to the income and relative price effects discussed above.  There is a well-established,
endogenous and countercyclical “monetary policy cycle” in the major developed economies.
Central banks ease monetary conditions and reduce interest rates during economic downturns
and increase interest rates when signs of overheating develop.  Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart
(1993) stress the importance of U.S. interest rates in driving the international capital flow cycle.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
4 The stylized evidence on patterns of trade is discussed in the next section.
5 See, for example, Reinhart (1995), who estimates industrial countries’ import demand function for various regions
and countries with varying degrees of export diversification and primary commodity content.
6 For example, manufactures account for only 10 percent of exports from Côte D’Ivoire but account for more than
65 percent of Thai exports.
7 See, for example, Dornbusch (1985); he stresses the role of the demand side in commodity price determination.
Borensztein and Reinhart (1994), who incorporate supply-side developments into their analysis, also find a
significant and positive relationship between growth in the major economies and world commodity prices.
6They present evidence that, in periods of low interest rates in the United States, central banks in
developing countries in Latin America systematically accumulate foreign exchange reserves and
that the real exchange rate appreciates; both of these developments are symptoms associated with
capital inflows.  Subsequent studies, which examined net capital flows and a variety of their
components over various sample periods and incorporated developing countries in other regions,
found similar evidence. This link between the interest rate and capital flow cycle may arise for a
variety of reasons.  It may be the case that investors in developed economies, faced with lower
interest rates, are inclined to seek higher returns elsewhere (i.e., the demand for developing
country assets increases).  It could also be that the decline in international interest rates makes
borrowing less costly for emerging markets and increases the supply of emerging market debt.
As illustrated in the interest rate parity condition below, where e denotes the expected change in
the exchange rate, the decline in the cost of borrowing for emerging-market countries (i) may be
even greater than the decline in international interest rates (i*) if the country risk premia (ρ ) is
itself a positive function of international interest rates:
0,*)(* >′∈++= ρρ eiii
The evidence presented in Fernández-Arias (1996) and Frankel, Schmukler and Servén
(2001) suggests that the country-risk premia in many emerging markets is indeed affected by
international interest rates in a way that amplifies the interest rate cycle in industrial countries.
Taken together, these findings would suggest that the trade and finance effects that arise from the
growth and interest rate cycles, respectively, in developed economies tend to at least partially
offset each other.  The countries that would benefit the most from the interest rate cycle may well
be those that start from a shakier financial position—that is, those with the highest international
debt-to-reserves ratios.  This is so because these countries would benefit the most from a decline
in debt-servicing costs (possibly also owing to a larger decline in their risk premia) and lose the
least in interest earnings from holding international reserves.  For example, a country like China,
which has a low level of external debt and a high level of external reserves, might even benefit
from interest rate increases in the United States—especially if the rate increases are owing to a
buoyant economy.  For other low-income countries, which have no access to international capital
markets under any interest rate scenario, this capital flow-debt servicing channel may not be
present at all.  Calvo and Reinhart (1996), for instance, who analyze the determinants of capital
flows to Africa, present evidence that (unlike other regions) capital flows are not systematically
7affected by changes in international interest rates but are heavily influenced by terms-of-trade
fluctuations.
Table 1.  Developed and Developing Country Links
Type of shock Transmission channel Amplifiers Expected
growth
consequences
The growth cycle:
Low
growth/recessions in
the G-3
Income effects Trade: Lower exports to
G-3
High trade exposure
High G-3 income
elasticities
Negative
Relative price effects Trade: Decline in the
terms of trade for
developing countries
High primary
commodity content in
exports
High exposure to
cyclical industries in
exports
Negative
International capital
flows
Finance: Higher bank
lending to emerging
markets but lower FDI
Large declines in the
domestic demand for
bank loans
Ambiguous
The interest rate
cycle:
Low interest
rates/monetary
easings
International capital
flows
Finance: Higher
portfolio capital flows to
emerging markets
Developed bond and
equity markets. Large
interest rate spreads.
High interest sensitivity
of flows.
Positive
Debt servicing Finance: Lower cost High levels of debt
relative to reserves.
Sensitive risk premia to
international interest
rates
Positive
Interest earnings Finance: Declining
interest income
High level of reserves
relative to debt
Not obvious
83.  The Role of G-3 Developments: The Stylized Facts
In this section, we present stylized evidence on the “North-South” links discussed in the
preceding section. For emerging markets, we examine international capital flows and growth in
relation to various measures of the United States growth and interest rate cycle and contrast
periods of high interest rate and exchange rate volatility with those where volatility was
relatively subdued. We present evidence on the direction of “North-South” trade and on the
impact of industrial country developments on international commodity markets.
Our data is annual, spanning from 1970 to 1999, and the country groupings are those
reported in the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (WEO).  For capital
flows, these groupings are the following: All emerging markets, Africa, Asia crisis countries,
other Asian emerging markets, the Middle East and Europe, the Western Hemisphere, and
countries in transition. In reporting growth aggregates, the WEO groups the Asian countries
somewhat differently; the two reported subgroupings are newly industrialized Asia and Asia; all
other categories remain the same.8 We examine the cyclical behavior of net private capital flows
and their components: net private direct investment (FDI), private portfolio investment (PI),
other net private capital flows (OTF)—which is heavily weighted toward bank lending and
capital flight, and net official flows (OFF).  We focus on real capital flows, defined as nominal
capital flows (in U.S. dollars) deflated by the U.S. consumer price index. The figures reported in
this section are in billions of 1970 dollars.
The Growth Cycle, Capital Flows, and Emerging Market Growth
Given its prominent position in the world economy, the United States business cycle (not
surprisingly) has important repercussions for the rest of the world. Developed economies, most
notably Canada, are deeply affected by economic developments in the United States; the same
holds true for developing economies, especially those in the Western Hemisphere and newly-
industrialized Asia, whose fates are more closely aligned with those of the United States than
other developing countries.  To examine the behavior of growth and various types of capital
flows to emerging markets, we first split the sample into two states of nature according to two
criteria.  The first of these parsing strategies involves separating the period into recessions and
expansions, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research’s dating of U.S. business
9cycle turning points; if six or more months of a given year fall into the recession category, then
that year is labeled a recession year.  The second cut of the data divides the sample into those
periods in which U.S. real GDP growth is above the median growth rate for the sample and those
in which growth is below the median.  Figures 1 and 2 depict capital flows to emerging markets
(billions of US dollars) in recession years versus recovery years for the 1970-1999 period.  The
picture shown in the top panel of Figure 1 reveals that net flows to emerging markets are almost
twice as large (almost US $60 billion) when the United States is in expansion as when the United
States is in recession.  Furthermore, this vast gap between recession and expansion owes
primarily to a surge in FDI flows (which go up nearly fivefold from recession to expansion) and
to portfolio flows (Figure 2, top panel).  Indeed, other net inflows to emerging markets fall from
about US $17 billion when the United States is in recession to about US $8 billion of net
outflows in expansions (Figure 2, bottom panel). This disparate behavior between FDI and
portfolio flows on the one hand and other flows on the other hand is not as paradoxical as it
appears on the surface. FDI targeted at supplying both final and intermediate goods to the U.S.
market can be expected to slow down. Furthermore, as noted earlier, bank lending accounts for a
significant part of other flows and banks tend to seek lending opportunities abroad when the
domestic demand for loans weakens, as it usually does during recessions.   The U.S. bank
lending boom to Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the surge in Japanese bank
lending to emerging Asia in the mid-1990s are two clear examples of this phenomenon.
However, the surge in FDI flows from the mid-1990s to the present is a significant
departure from FDI’s historical behavior and it is, no doubt, heavily influenced by the wave of
privatizations and mergers and acquisitions that took hold in many emerging markets during
recent years.  Hence, it is plausible to expect that some of this surge in FDI is non-recurring. Yet,
during this period of privatizations and surging FDI, the United States is enjoying its longest
economic expansion, which may skew the results toward finding an exaggerated role for U.S.
growth in driving FDI and total net flows. To examine whether the “anomalous” FDI surge of
the 1990s is responsible for these results, we ended our sample in 1992, which is two years
following the only U.S. recession in the 1990s.  The results paint a somewhat different picture:
capital flows to emerging markets do not increase as much during economic upturns in the
United States.  While FDI flows and portfolio flows continue to be markedly higher in
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expansions than in recessions, the drop in other flows during expansions almost fully offsets this
tendency.
Indeed, truncating the sample reveals that, while FDI and portfolio flows do appear
positively related to the U.S. economic cycle (as before), the impact of the economic cycle on
these components of private flows is somewhat smaller than that suggested by Figures 1 and 2.
Yet, the countercyclical behavior of other flows in the smaller sample remains consistent with
the results for the entire period.  Splitting the sample into years in which U.S. real GDP growth is
above the median growth rate for the sample and those in which growth is below the median
reveals a similar pattern.
In sum, from the vantage point of the volume of capital flows to emerging markets, U.S.
recessions are not obviously a bad thing.  From a compositional standpoint, however, the more
stable component of capital flows, FDI, does seem to contract during downturns in the United
States, suggesting that emerging markets may wind up during these periods relying more heavily
on less stable sources of financing, such as short-term flows.9
The Growth Cycle and Trade
If economic downturns in the United States are not necessarily a bad thing from the vantage
point of the availability of international lending to emerging markets, slowdowns are likely to
have adverse consequences for countries that rely heavily on exports to the United States.  Table
2 reports the exports (as of 1999) of various emerging markets in Africa, Asia, and the Western
Hemisphere that are destined for the United States market, both as a share of total exports
(column 1) and as a share of GDP (column 3).
It is evident that bilateral trade links between the United States and the developing world
are generally strongest for Latin America, although there is considerable variation within the
region, with Mexico and Argentina at the two ends of the spectrum. However, trade between the
United States and the Asian countries shown in this table is also substantial because of their
larger degree of openness.  Furthermore, these numbers underestimate the relative impact on
Asian countries on account of the content of their exports, because the income elasticity in
developed economies for Asian exports is more than twice as large as the income elasticity for
African exports.  More generally, the elasticity of developing countries that are major exporters
                                                          
9  Other flows are mostly short-term.
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of manufactures is well above that of those whose exports have a higher primary commodity
content.
As noted earlier, swings in the economic cycle in the United States and other major
industrialized economies have had a systematic impact on the terms of trade of primary-
commodity exporters.  According to the various studies reviewed in Table 4, a one percentage
point drop in industrial production growth in the developed economies results in a drop in real
commodity prices of roughly 0.77 to about 2 percent, depending on which study is considered.
Table 2.  United States and Developing Country Trade Patterns, 1999
Region/Country Exports to the
U.S. as share
of total exports
(in percent)
Ratio Exports
to GDP (PPP)
1998
Exports to the United States
as a share of GDP  (in percent)
Latin America
Mexico 88.3 16.7 14.7
Venezuela 55.4 14.1 7.8
Chile 19.4 16.7 3.2
Colombia 50.3 5.9 2.9
Peru 29.3 7.1 2.1
Brazil 22.5 5.3 1.2
Argentina 11.3 7.2 0.8
Asia
Singapore 19.2 168.1 32.3
Malaysia 21.9 45.9 10.1
Korea 20.6 25.0 5.2
Thailand 21.5 19.7 4.2
Philippines 29.6 13.6 4.0
Indonesia 16.1 9.4 1.5
China Mainland 21.5 5.4 1.2
Africa
Congo, Rep. 19.0 44.7 8.5
South Africa 8.2 9.8 0.8
Zimbabwe 5.8 9.3 0.5
Kenya 4.6 9.9 0.5
Chad 7.2 5.3 0.4
Ethiopia 8.4 2.9 0.2
Uganda 5.4 3.1 0.2
Mozambique 4.8 3.4 0.2
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund (2000).  World Development
Indicators Database (2000), World Bank.
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Table 3. Industrial Countries’ Demand for Developing Country Exports
Study and Sample Period Importing country Exporting country Income Elasticity
Dornbusch (1985), 1960-
1983
All non-oil developing 1.74
Major exporters of manufactures 2.67
Márquez (1990) Canada Non OPEC developing 2.83
Germany Non OPEC developing 2.29
Japan Non OPEC developing 1.22
United Kingdom Non OPEC developing 1.45
United States Non OPEC developing 3.04
Rest of OECD Non OPEC developing 2.61
Reinhart (1995), 1970-1991 All developed All developing 2.05
Africa 1.25
Asia 2.49
Latin America 2.07
Table 4. Commodity Prices and Economic Cycles: A Review
Study Dependent
variable/sample
period
Measure of developed-
country growth rate used
Coefficient the developed
country growth rate
Borensztein and Reinhart
(1994)
All commodity index/
1971:1-1992:3,
quarterly
Industrial production for
developed economies
1.40
All commodity index/
1971:1-1992:3,
quarterly
Industrial production for
developed economies plus
GDP for the Former Soviet
Union
1.54
Chu and Morrison (1984) All commodity index/
1958-1982, quarterly
GDP weighted industrial
production-G-7 countries
1.66
Dornbusch (1985) All commodity index/
1970:2-1985:1,
quarterly
OECD industrial production 2.07
Holtham (1988) All commodity index/
1967:2-1982:2,
semiannual
GDP growth for the G-7
economies
0.51
Industrial production for the
G-7 economies
0.77
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We conducted the same exercise as for capital flows for emerging market average annual
GDP growth. As shown in Table 5, for all developing countries, growth is somewhat slower
during U.S. recessions, averaging 4.8 percent per annum versus 5.2 percent average growth
during expansion years. However, the pattern is uneven across regions.  For the countries in
transition, Asia (including the newly-industrialized economies), and the Middle East and Europe
growth tends to slow during U.S. recessions, while for Africa and the Western Hemisphere, the
opposite is true.  However, in most instances the differences across regimes are not markedly
different—an issue we will explore further later.
Table 5. Economic Growth and the U.S. Business Cycle, 1970-1999
Average Annual Real GDP Growth (in percent)
Major Regional
Groupings
Entire Period During U.S. Recessions During U.S. Expansions
Newly Industrialized
Asian Economies
7.68 7.11 7.79
Developing Countries 5.08 4.82 5.21
Western Hemisphere 3.69 3.81 3.58
Africa 2.91 3.29 2.77
Asia 6.57 6.25 6.69
 Middle East and Europe 4.43 4.31 4.52
  Countries in Transition 1.51 2.71 0.88
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund.
Notes: Recessions and expansions are dated according to the National Bureau of Economic Research’s dating of
U.S. business cycle turning points; if six or more months of a given year fall into the recession category, then that
year is labeled a recession year.
The Interest Rate-Monetary Policy Cycle
As noted earlier, in a world of countercyclical monetary policy in industrial countries, it is
difficult to talk about an economic cycle without analyzing the consequences of the interest rate
cycle that, more often than not, goes hand in hand with economic fluctuations. As with the
growth cycle, we proceed to describe the stylized evidence by breaking up the sample in two
ways.  First, we subdivide the 1970-1999 sample into two subsamples, one in which monetary
policy was “easing”—that is to say that the federal funds rate was declining—and periods of
tightening, when the federal funds rate is rising.  However, this cut of the data does not
discriminate between modest and marked policy changes, as a 50 basis point drop in the federal
14
funds rate during a given year would be lumped together with a 400 basis point drop. To get at
this issue, we also break the sample into periods when real interest rates are above the sample
median and those years when rates are below the median.10   
Figures 3 and 4 show the results of this exercise. Irrespective of whether the observations
are split along the lines of rising versus falling interest rates or interest rate levels above or below
their median, or whether the sample ends in 1999 or 1992, the outcomes are consistent.  In years
when U.S. monetary policy is easing (i.e., the federal funds rate is declining), emerging markets
in all regions receive a markedly higher volume of capital inflows.  While FDI and portfolio
flows do not change much, other (short-term) flows respond markedly to the interest rate cycle.11
Table 6. Economic Growth and U.S. Monetary Policy, 1970-1999
Average Annual real GDP Growth (in percent)
Major Regional
Groupings
Entire Period During U.S.
Tightenings
During U.S. Easings
Newly Industrialized
Asian Economies
7.68 8.79 6.93
Developing Countries 5.08 5.17 5.02
Western Hemisphere 3.69 4.21 3.34
Africa 2.91 2.63 3.10
Asia 6.57 6.72 6.46
Middle East and
Europe
4.43 3.87 4.80
Countries in
Transition
1.51 2.96 0.65
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund.
Notes: Easing/tightening are those years that the Federal Funds rate declined/rose, respectively.
                                                          
10 Our real interest rate measure is constructed by taking the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate and subtracting the
consumer price inflation rate for that year.
11The surge in net private inflows is even more dramatic when the sample is split according to whether real interest
rates are above or below their sample median.  As before, Africa is the only region unaffected by the interest rate
cycle in the United States.
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4.  Assessing the Impact of the “North’s” Business and Interest Rate Cycles: A
First Cut
In the preceding section, we discussed the stylized evidence on capital flows, growth and U.S.
developments. In what follows, we take that analysis further by examining the interaction
between the “twin” monetary policy-growth cycles and capital flows and its components.
Stylized Evidence on the Twin Cycles
Table 7 cuts the sample into four states of nature for the United States: recession accompanied by
monetary policy tightening, recession accompanied by easing, expansion and tightening, and
expansion and monetary policy easing.12  Our priors as regards emerging markets growth are
straightforward: high U.S. growth and easier monetary policy would provide the best conditions
for more rapid growth in emerging markets.  As for capital flows, the priors are less well defined.
The Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) hypothesis would suggest that tighter monetary
policy (i.e., rising interest rates) would lead to (other things being equal) lower capital flows to
emerging markets. On the other hand, while recessions in the North may dampen FDI flows (as
these are often linked to trade), economic slowdowns tend to be accompanied by a weakening in
the domestic demand for loans—which, in the past, has often led banks to seek lending
opportunities abroad.  In other words, the consequences of the U.S. cycle for capital flows are, in
principle, ambiguous.
Table 7 presents net capital flows and their components to all emerging markets during
these four states of nature.  As the top panel indicates, net flows more than double along the
diagonal, suggesting that both lower interest rates and faster growth in the United States are a
potential catalyst for capital flows into emerging markets.  However, as the previous discussion
suggested, this feature is not even across categories. FDI and portfolio flows thrive when
expansions are coupled with falling interest rates. Other flows, which are largely comprised of
bank lending, do not.  Like other flows, these tend to increase in periods of falling interest rates
but contract during expansions; other flows are highest when the U.S. is in recession and interest
rates are falling.
                                                          
12 The recession years are based on NBER dates, while the monetary policy cycle is split into years in which the
federal funds rate is declining and those in which it is rising.
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Table 7. Real Capital Flows and the Twin Cycles: All Emerging Market Economies
(Billions of 1970 U.S. dollars)
Net Private Capital Flows Recession Expansion
Tightening 8.6 13.2
Easing 13.9 19.3
Net Private Direct
Investment
Tightening 3.4 11.0
Easing 4.2 11.5
Net Private Portfolio
Investment
Tightening 0.2 4.0
Easing 1.5 6.6
Other Net Private Capital
Flows
Tightening 5.0 1.8
Easing 8.4 1.2
Source: World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund.
Notes: Recessions and expansions are dated according to the National Bureau of Economic Research’s dating of
U.S. business cycle turning points; if six or more months of a given year fall into the recession category, then that
year is labeled a recession year.  Easing/tightening are those years that the Federal Funds rate declined/rose.
Basic Tests
However, the preceding discussion does not shed light on the relative statistical significance of
the twin cycles.  To address that issue, we next run a variety of simple regressions that attempt to
explain capital flows and growth in emerging markets through developments in the developed
economies, particularly the United States.  Our sample spans 1970-1999 for all regions except
the Western Hemisphere, where the debt crisis (1981-1986) period is excluded.13
The dependent variable is a real private capital flow measure, which includes four
categories: Net capital flows, net direct investment, net portfolio flows, and other capital flows.
The regressors in the first set of panel regressions are real U.S. GDP growth and the U.S. real
interest rate.  Neither of these variables poses a potential endogeneity problem, since both are
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exogenous to other factors affecting developing country growth.  Our estimation method is a
simple OLS.  Table 9 reports the results of this regression for all emerging market economies as
well as for particular regions.
Table 8. U.S. Determinants of Real Capital Flows: 1970-1999
Dependent variable: Independent
Variables:
Total Emerging
Market
Economies
U.S. Real GDP
Growth
U.S. Interest
Rates1
R2
Net Capital Flows -1.09
(1.11)
-2.32
(0.96)
0.18
Net Direct Investment 0.26
(0.88)
-1.57
(0.76)
0.16
Net Portfolio
Investment
-0.33
(0.57)
-1.26
(0.50)
0.19
Other Net Capital
Flows
-1.06
(0.88)
0.50
(0.71)
0.09
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
 1 Nominal 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate.
As shown in Table 8, when examining the results for the emerging market aggregate as
well as for most of the regional subgroups, the results that predominantly emerge are that U.S.
interest rates play a more dominant and systematic role in explaining capital flows to emerging
markets than U.S. economic growth; rising U.S. interest rates are associated with falling capital
flows to emerging markets.  In effect, in many of the regressions the coefficient on growth is
negative, suggesting that when the U.S. is enjoying rapid growth capital stays at home.  This
effect is most pronounced in Other Net Flows, which largely consists of bank lending.  Both FDI
flows and portfolio flows are consistently interest rate-sensitive.14
There are, however, various regional differences worth highlighting.15   First, U.S. real
interest rates are significant in explaining portfolio and FDI flows in all regions—but the impacts
of real interest rates are greatest in the Western Hemisphere and lowest in Africa.  This result
may simply highlight that, among the emerging markets with some extent of access to
                                                                                                                                                                                          
13 During the Latin American debt crisis bank lending behavior was dominated by debt restructuring; thus the
evolution of bank lending during this period is markedly different from the remainder of the sample.
14 Similar results obtain, when developed-country real GDP growth rates are used in lieu of the U.S. growth rate.
These results are not reported but are available from the authors.
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international capital markets (Asia and Latin America), the latter are more heavily indebted and
interconnected with the United States.  Second, growth in the United States has a significant and
positive influence in explaining FDI to the Western Hemisphere, which is not the case for other
regions. Third, as the descriptive analysis anticipated, the other capital flow category behaves
very differently from FDI and portfolio flows.
We next perform a comparable exercise for growth. In assessing the links between
developing debtor countries and their developed counterparts, Dornbusch (1985) performed a
similar exercise.  The dependent variable was developing country GDP growth (as is the case
here) while the independent variable was a measure of OECD growth.16 He found the coefficient
on the OECD growth measure to be statistically significant and in the 0.28-0.76 range.  More
recently, Frankel and Roubini (2000) regress developing country growth for various regional
groupings against the G-7 real interest rate; they found that the coefficients on real interest rates
were negative and in most cases statistically significant, with the greatest interest sensitivity in
the Western Hemisphere.17
Our exercise here combines these two approaches. As shown in Table 9, when GDP
growth for the various country groupings is regressed against U.S. growth and the level of U.S.
real interest rates, the results tend to be quite intuitive. The sensitivity of growth to U.S. growth
is highest (and statistically significant) for the newly industrialized Asian Economies which
depend importantly on trade with the United States (followed by the Western Hemisphere), and
lowest for the remainder of Asia.  For all developing countries, both of the regressors have the
anticipated signs and are statistically significant. A one percentage point decline in U.S. growth
rates reduces GDP growth for the developing countries by 0.23 percent while a one percent
increase in U.S. real interest rates reduces it by 0.27 percent.  Because of (probably) strong trade
links with the United States for most countries in the region, U.S. growth is statistically
significant for the Western Hemisphere, and the coefficient is positively signed. U.S. growth is
also significant for the Middle East and European developing countries.  Given its history of
relatively high levels of indebtedness and periodic debt-servicing difficulties, it is not surprising
that the U.S. real interest rate is significant and growth is the most sensitive to interest rate
fluctuations in the Western Hemisphere; the coefficient (-0.81) is almost three times as large, in
                                                                                                                                                                                          
15 This discussion is based on Appendix Tables 1-2.
16 He used industrial production, real GDP growth, and import volume alternatively; the sample was 1961-84.
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absolute terms, as for all developing countries.  Indeed, one cannot reject the hypothesis that a 1-
percent increase in U.S. real interest rates leads to a 1-percent decline in growth in the region.
Real U.S. interest rates are also statistically significant for the Middle East and Europe. At the
other end, among the newly industrialized Asian economies, with low levels of external debt and
uninterrupted access to private capital markets, U.S. interest rates are not significant, although
the coefficient has the (expected) negative sign.  As far as these regressions are concerned, U.S.
developments have no systematic relationship with the rest of developing Asia or the transition
economies.
Table 9.  Developing Country Growth and U.S. Developments
Country Group Independent variables
U.S. GDP growth U.S. Real Interest
Rate
R2
Newly Industrialized
Asian Economies
0.58
(0.26)
-0.21
(0.24)
0.16
Developing Countries 0.23
(0.11)
-0.27
(0.10)
0.25
Western Hemisphere 0.42
(0.17)
-0.81
(0.16)
0.51
Africa 0.07
(0.16)
-0.17
(0.15)
0.04
Asia -0.02
(0.18)
0.20
(0.17)
0.05
Middle East and
Europe
0.50
(0.28)
-0.56
(0.27)
0.18
Countries in
Transition
0.37
(0.46)
-0.33
(0.44)
0.03
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have not attempted to predict the fate of the U.S. economy but rather to analyze
and quantify how developments in the United States have affected emerging market economies
in the past.  As regards the impact of the U.S. economic and interest rate cycle, our main findings
can be summarized as follows.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
17 The coefficient for the Western Hemisphere was -0.77 compared to -0.39 for all market borrowers.
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Recessions in the United States are associated with a lower volume of capital flows to
emerging markets; FDI flows are particularly sensitive to the growth cycle.  Other capital flows
(which include bank lending and capital flight), however, behave countercyclically—banks seek
to lend abroad as U.S. loan demand weakens during recessions.  This offset has, at least
historically, cushioned the blow.
Other things being equal, lower U.S. real GDP growth is also associated with lower
growth in developing countries.  The difference in U.S. GDP growth rates between expansion
and recession years is 3.3 percent.18  Hence, in an “average” U.S. recession, the slowdown alone
would shave about 3/5 percent off growth in developing countries’ GDP growth (Table 10).
However, some regions like the Western Hemisphere and the newly industrialized economies of
Asia would be hit harder.
Table 10.  U.S. Growth and Interest Rates in Recessions and Expansions
and Implications for Developing Country Growth
(in percent)
U.S. GDP
Growth
Average
During:
U.S. Real Interest
Rate Average
During:
Expansion
(1)
Recession
(2)
Difference
(3)=(1)-(2)
Expansion
(4)
Recession
(5)
Difference
(6)=(4)-(5)
4.1 0.8 3.3 1.9 0.5 1.4
Developing Country
Growth and the U.S.
Growth and Interest
Rate Channels
Country Grouping U.S. Growth effect Interest rate effect Combined effect
Newly Industrialized
Asian Economies
-1.914 0.294 -1.62
Developing
Countries
-0.759 0.378 -0.381
Western Hemisphere -1.386 1.134 -0.252
Africa -0.231 0.238 0.007
Asia 0.066 -0.28 -0.214
Middle East and
Europe
-1.65 0.784 -0.866
                                                          
18 Recession years are dated according to the NBER criteria.
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But other things are not equal, and nominal and real interest rates usually fall during
recessions as the Federal Reserve attempts to revive the economy.  Real interest rates typically
fall by about one-and-half percent during recessions, which translates (other things equal) to
about half a point boost to real GDP growth for the all developing country category (Table 11)
and considerably more for the relatively indebted nations of the Western Hemisphere (which
maintain access to international capital markets).
However, “double-whammies,” recessions coupled with tight money, are unambiguously
terrible news for the developing world.  Total capital flows to emerging markets are less than one
half their level of the “boom” (expansions coupled with easings).  The interest rate cycle and
monetary policy cycle are mutually reinforcing, with amplified consequences for growth.
Indeed, the last double whammy in our sample sets the stage for the debt crisis in Latin America
and elsewhere in the early 1980s.  The probability of a double whammy has, at least historically,
been tied to the inflation performance of the United States.  A banking or financial crisis in the
United States could conceivably lead to the same outcome.
Finally, if FDI is the most stable and desirable of capital flows from an emerging market
perspective, and if international bank lending is volatile and more prone to sudden reversals (as
was the case with Japanese bank lending to emerging Asia during the crisis), then a recession in
the United States has, at least historically, resulted in a “deterioration” in the composition of the
capital flows emerging markets receive.  FDI shrinks in recessions while bank lending fills up
some of that space.
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Appendix Table 1. U.S. Determinants of Real Capital Flows: 1970-1999
Country Group Independent
variables
Africa Dependent Variable U.S. GDP growth
U.S. Interest Rate 
1
R
2
Net Capital flows 0.04
(0.19)
0.21
(0.17)
0.06
Net Direct Investment 0.00
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.03)
0.15
Net Portfolio Investment 0.04
(0.05)
-0.09
(0.04)
0.21
Other Net Capital Flows 0.00
(0.20)
0.37
(0.18)
0.15
Other Asian
Emerging Markets
Net Capital flows -0.06
(0.31)
-0.26
(0.27)
0.03
Net Direct Investment 0.07
(0.31)
-0.64
(0.27)
0.19
Net Portfolio Investment -0.04
(0.06)
-0.04
(0.05)
0.03
Other Net Capital Flows -0.09
(0.28)
0.42
(0.25)
0.11
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
1 Nominal 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate.
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Appendix Table 2. U.S. Determinants of Real Capital Flows: 1970-1999
Country Group Independent
variables
Asia, Crisis
Countries
Dependent Variable U.S. GDP growth U.S. Interest Rate 1
R
2
Net Capital flows -0.42
(0.39)
0.05
(0.34)
0.05
Net Direct Investment 0.02
(0.06)
-0.12
(0.06)
0.15
Net Portfolio
Investment
-0.05
(0.15)
-0.25
(0.13)
0.13
Other Net Capital Flows -0.35
(0.29)
0.43
(0.29)
0.18
Middle East and
Europe
Net Capital flows -0.25
(0.54)
-1.68
(0.46)
0.33
Net Direct Investment 0.08
(0.08)
-0.07
(0.08)
0.11
Net Portfolio
Investment
-0.06
(0.14)
0.02
(0.12)
0.01
Other Net Capital Flows -0.27
(0.46)
-1.63
(0.40)
0.39
Western Hemisphere
Net Capital flows 0.70
(0.91)
-2.71
(0.85)
0.53
Net Direct Investment 1.69
(0.84)
-0.93
(0.79)
0.36
Net Portfolio
Investment
0.03
(0.81)
-2.60
(0.75)
0.55
Other Net Capital Flows -0.97
(0.89)
0.83
(0.83)
0.20
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
1 Nominal 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate.
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Figure 1. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and the U.S. Business Cycle,
1970-1999
Net Private Capital Flows
expansion recession
billions 1970 US$
Total
Africa
Asia-crisis
Other Asian emerging
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere.
-5 0 5 10 15 20
Net Private Direct Investment
expansion recession
billions 1970 US$
Total
Africa
Asia-crisis
Other Asian emerging
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
-2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
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Figure 2. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and the U.S. Business Cycle
1970-1999 (continued)
Net Private Portfolio Investment
expansion recession
billions 1970 US$
Total
Africa
Asia-crisis
Other Asian emerging
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
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Other Net Private Capital Flows
expansion recession
billions 1970 US$
Total
Africa
Asia-crisis
Other Asian emerging
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
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Figure 3. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and the U.S. Monetary Policy Cycle,
1970-1999
Net Private Capital Flows
easing tightening
billions 1970 US$
Total
Africa
Asia-crisis
Other Asian emerging
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Figure 4. Real Capital Flows to Emerging Markets and the U.S. Monetary Policy Cycle,
1970-1999 (continued)
Net Private Portfolio Investment
easing tightening
billions 1970 US$
Total
Africa
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Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
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